**2020-07-08 벙커 자료 : 인도 태평양**

**김민경**

**1. The Diplomat : Renewing America’s Commitment to the Indo-Pacific (07.02)**

**(**<https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/renewing-americas-commitment-to-the-indo-pacific/>)

**Jim Inhofe and Cory Gardner are U.S. Senators.**

As China brashly tries to impose its own system of rules and order in the Pacific, the United States and our allies in the Indo-Pacific confront a time for choosing. We must choose to advance our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. We must choose to ensure the success of the principles of regional and global order that remain essential to our shared security and prosperity. These are difficult choices that will come at increasingly greater cost. Beijing will do its best to make sure that the right choice and the easy choice are never the same, but we believe Americans and our allies are up to the task.

For instance, U.S. allies **like Australia** are already making the tough choices, while braving Beijing’s bluster and bullying. By standing by its calls for an independent inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus and by remaining open to trade while refusing to trade away fundamental values, Australia has set a proud example for all the world. As Beijing lashes out across the region from the Himalayan Mountains to the South China Sea, Australia’s actions serve as a reminder for our other allies that in a free and open Indo-Pacific, right makes might — and not the other way around.

Australia should not be alone in this effort. The United States stands with our allies, and we are prepared to make our own tough choices.

In the United States, we have seen how even in the most rancorous political times, Republicans and Democrats have joined together to renew the country’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, like when **the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA)** became law in December 2018. As was stated in the **U.S. Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, released in July 2019**: “This legislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote **sovereignty, rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security.**”

In the coming days, the U.S. Senate will take the next step toward renewing the country’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region **by passing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,** **which establishes a new Pacific Deterrence Initiative** that will complement ARIA and implement its vision of a more robust U.S military presence in the Indo-Pacific. This initiative will enhance the security commitments set forth in ARIA, and help guide Congress and the Pentagon in making the tough choices necessary to prioritize the Indo-Pacific and extend critical deterrence initiatives to check our adversaries.

Last year, a [seminal report from the United States Studies Centre (USSC) at the University of Sydney](https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific) provided one of the clearest explanations of why the need for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is both real and urgent. The report shows how China is attempting to “undercut America’s military primacy” and “sowing doubt about Washington’s security guarantees in the process.” In the face of this development, the report describes an “increasingly worrying mismatch between America’s strategy and resources,” especially in the Indo-Pacific. Even as “America’s military services have started to implement much-needed changes,” the report warns, it’s not clear that America will have the “budgetary capacity or strategic focus to deliver these in a robust and timely way.” We share these concerns, and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is designed explicitly to address them.

**First, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will enhance budgetary transparency and congressional oversight by organizing our defense budget around critical Indo-Pacific priorities.** The initiative will make it easier to translate regional priorities into budget priorities, and ensure that security requirements are being matched with the necessary resources.

**Second, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will focus resources on key capability gaps to give U.S. forces everything they need to compete, fight, and win in the Indo-Pacific.** The initiative would focus new resources in many of the areas recommended by the USSC report, including a more distributed regional defense posture, resilient logistics networks, fuel and munitions storage, missile defenses for U.S. bases, and more experimentation to test and prove new operational concepts.

**Third, consistent with ARIA provisions, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will prioritize cooperation with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.** The initiative will increase security assistance for our regional allies and partners, and invest in interoperability. In the future, we expect the initiative will provide resources to support new mechanisms for deepening regional defense cooperation, including multinational fusion centers and joint training and experimentation.

**Fourth, and finally, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will help preserve peace in the Indo-Pacific by bolstering credible deterrence.** The initiative will focus resources on efforts to deny our adversaries the possibility of a quick, easy, or cheap victory. By injecting uncertainty and risk into the calculations of our adversaries, we can discourage them from choosing the path of aggression.

The Pacific Deterrence Initiative is by no means a cure-all. After all, achieving credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region is **not America’s task alone.** It can only be realized through a **collective effort with our allies and partners such as Australia**. Moreover, the challenges we face today are not limited to, or even primarily, military in character. As ARIA emphasized, we must also step up our diplomatic and economic security efforts while remaining true to our values. Nonetheless, we hope the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will serve as another demonstration to our mates in **Australia,** as well as our other allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, that America’s commitment to the region remains bipartisan and enduring.

**2. Australian Government : 2020 Defence Strategic Update (07.01)**

(<https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/>)

<Executive Summary>

**1.** **Australia is at the centre of a dynamic strategic environment.** In response, Australia’s defence policy **must be agile and adaptive.** In line with the Government’s intent that defence strategy be subject to regular review, the Department of Defence commenced a Strategic Policy Review in 2019 to re-assess the strategic underpinnings of the 2016 Defence White Paper.

2. While the drivers shaping the development of Australia’s future strategic environment identified in that white paper remain relevant, some have accelerated in ways that were not anticipated in 2016.

3. Military modernisation in the Indo-Pacific has accelerated faster than envisaged. Regional force modernisation has resulted in the development and deployment of new weapons that challenge Australia’s military capability edge. Expanding cyber capabilities – and the willingness of some countries and non-state actors to use them – are further complicating Australia’s strategic environment.

4. Confidence in the rules-based global order is being undermined by disruptions from a widening range of sources. Major power competition has intensified and the prospect of high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific, while still unlikely, is less remote than in the past.

5. The conduct of ‘grey-zone’ activities has also expanded in the Indo-Pacific. These activities involve military and non-military forms of assertiveness and coercion aimed at achieving strategic goals without provoking conflict. In the Indo-Pacific, these activities have ranged from militarisation of the South China Sea to active interference, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion. Defence must be better prepared to respond to these activities, including by working more closely with other elements of Australia’s national power.

6. This security environment is markedly different from the relatively more benign one of even four years ago, with greater potential for military miscalculation. This could conceivably include state-on-state conflict that could engage the Australian Defence Force (ADF) where Australia’s interests are threatened. Accordingly, Defence must be better prepared for the prospect of high-intensity conflict.

7. Although the long-term impacts of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic are not yet clear, it has altered the economic trajectory of the region and the world with implications for Australia’s prosperity and security. The trend towards a more competitive and contested region will not be fundamentally altered by the effects of the pandemic, but it is sharpening some aspects of strategic competition between the United States and China. Some countries are using the situation to seek greater influence, while countries that were expected to become more prosperous and stable may experience economic hardship and instability. The pandemic has also highlighted the importance of secure supply chains for Defence and defence industry, including sovereign industrial capability in some areas.

8. This 2020 Defence Strategic Update sets out the challenges in Australia’s strategic environment and their implications for defence planning. It provides a new strategic policy framework to ensure Australia is able – and is understood as willing – to deploy military power to shape our environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with military force.

**9.** **The Government has decided that under this new framework, defence planning will focus on our immediate region: ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific.** This new framework will provide a tight focus for defence planning and alignment with broader initiatives such as the Pacific Step-up.

10. This will have implications for Defence capability and force structure. It will mean adjustments to the plans set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper so that we are prepared for the challenges we are most likely to face. These adjustments focus on ensuring the ADF can shape Australia’s strategic environment, deliver credible deterrence and respond to challenges to our interests. **More detail on the Government’s capability plans is set out in the 2020 Force Structure Plan.**

**11. Defence will continue to strengthen its engagement with Australia’s international partners in support of shared regional security interests and will continue to deepen Australia’s alliance with the United States.**

**12.** The Government’s plans for Defence capability are underpinned by its policies of developing a strong, sustainable and secure Australian defence industry and supporting leading edge national innovation. The Government is committed to **maximising opportunities for Australian industry**, including in regional areas, in Defence projects.

**13**. The Government’s plans for future ADF capability are also underpinned by its ongoing commitment to providing funding certainty for Defence. This includes a commitment to a Defence Budget of $42.2 billion in 2020-21 (including the Australian Signals Directorate). **The Defence Budget will grow** over the next ten years to $73.7 billion in 2029-30 with total funding over the decade of $575 billion. This total includes approximately $270 billion of investment in Defence capability, compared with approximately $195 billion for the decade to 2025-26 when the 2016 Defence White Paper was released.

14 .Continuous transformational reform within Defence is essential to implement the strategy set out in this document and to build Defence’s capacity to respond to a more uncertain external environment. Reform cannot be a one-off process – improvement is continual – and it must be purposeful. Defence will continue to evolve and adapt to meet Australia’s changing strategic environment and maintain alignment of strategy, capability and resources

**3. The Heritage Foundation : The Quad 2.0: A Foundation for a Free and Open Indo–Pacific (07.06)**

 (<https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-quad-20-foundation-free-and-open-indo-pacific>)

[**Jeff Smith**](https://www.heritage.org/staff/jeff-m-smith)

**Summary**

The “Quad”—the grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—was **reborn in November 2017.** The initiative is the physical manifestation of **several complementary geostrategic trends of recent years**: **growing comfort and convergence among the four democracies**, **growing concerns about China’s rise** and **the implications for international rules and norms setting**, and **an emerging shared vision for the Indo–Pacific region**. What binds the Quad’s members and separates them from other groupings is their **cumulative power, their shared threat assessments, their shared commitment to rules and norms, and their willingness to defy China when Beijing is acting against their interests.** Continuing to strengthen cooperation is their best hope for defending their interests and maintaining their sovereignty and independence in the shadow of China’s rise.

**KEY TAKEAWAYS**

1. In November 2017, almost 10 years after it first collapsed, **the “Quad**”—a strategic dialogue among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia—**was reborn.**

2. **The Quad’s revival was catalyzed by increasing cooperation among the four capitals, India’s growing comfort with the group, and shared threat assessments of China.**

3.The U.S. should continue to provide strong leadership for the Quad, elevating the importance of the dialogue and adding new layers of form and functionality.