

I 참고 싱크탱크

i. 영국

가) Chatham House(Royal Institute of International Affairs)

- 1 비영리 비정부기구로 주요 국제현안과 시사문제를 중심으로 한다.

나) International Institute for Strategic Studies

- 1 무력 충돌, 미래 갈등과 사이버 안보, 국방과 군사 분석, 경제 및 에너지 안보, 지리경제와 전략, 비확산 및 핵 정책, 안보와 개발을 중심으로 한다.

ii. 프랑스

가) Institut français des relations internationales

- 1 프랑스의 대표적인 국제 관계 연구소이다.

나) Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques

- 1 지정학적 및 전략적 주제를 중심으로 연구하며, 프랑스 국방부와 긴밀한 관계를 유지한다.

iii. 독일

가) Ifo Institute for Economic Research

- 1 뮌헨에 위치한 연구 기관으로 다방면으로 연구를 진행한다. 연방 및 국가간 공동 연구 지원을 받고 있다.

나) Konrad Adenauer Foundation(Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung)

- 1 기독교민주연합과 친밀한 관계를 유지하며, 연방과 국가의 자금으로 재정 지원을 받고 있다.

1. IISS

China's first HGV, the DF-17, is expected to become operational some time in 2020 and has the potential to function as a highly effective anti-access/area-denial weapon in the Western Pacific.

China's DF-17 HGV, which is nearing operational readiness, will have a range of approximately 2,000 km and the ability to threaten US ships and bases in the Western Pacific.

Hypersonic weapons and strategic stability, IISS, <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2020/hypersonic-weapons-and-strategic-stability>.

2. IFRI

The fourth wave, although still hypothetical, is the much-discussed reconfiguration of global value chains. Foreign industries that have relied too much on China's market and supply chains seem to be reconsidering their strategies. It could result in the relocation of investments and factories from China to other countries in Southeast Asia, North Africa or Europe.

First is the full-on "wolf warrior" diplomacy Beijing has displayed. Although China keeps presenting itself as a responsible and reliable stakeholder providing health supplies to many countries in need amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it missed opportunities to actually prove its commitment to multilateralism.

The second factor is the doubts and mistrust that have risen worldwide about the information China has delivered – or not – regarding the management of the crisis. Despite Beijing's tireless efforts to impose its own narrative, its transparency has been questioned on issues such as the number of cases and deaths, the origin of the virus, or influence over the WHO.

The third factor relates to Chinese diplomats' poor management of public relations crisis.

In Africa, they found themselves under fire after a surge of racist actions against African people in Guangzhou in mid-April.

Overall, China's diplomacy amid the pandemic has been unsuccessful at best, or very counter-productive at worst, degrading China's image abroad. Even the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a high-profile think tank under the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, is said to have recently produced an internal report to the government assessing that "global anti-China sentiment is at its highest since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown".

Economy and Diplomacy: China's two Challenges in the Post-Covid-19 World, ifri, <https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/editoriaux-de-lifri/lettre-centre-asie/economy-and-diplomacy-chinas-two-challenges-post>.

3. Konrad

It does retain considerable influence, including through close links with the former King Norodom Sihanouk, senior members of the Cambodian Government and the ethnic Chinese community in Cambodia. There are regular high-level exchanges between the two countries. China has provided substantial bilateral aid, and the economic links has since continued to grow. "Action Plan 2019-2023 on Building China-Cambodia Community of Shared Future" in April 2019. Under this action plan, the two countries committed to undertake 31 measures in the five domains of politics, security, economics, people-to-people relations, and multilateral cooperation. China also vowed to push bilateral trade to 10 billion USD by 2023 and encouraged more Chinese investment flow to Cambodia

In the educational sector, from 2004 to 2017, China offered more than 1,000 scholarships to Cambodian students to pursue their education in China, and more than 700 fellowships for short-term training.

On 5 February 2020, Cambodian PM Hun Sen made a surprise and overnight-planned visit to Beijing amid the coronavirus outbreak in the country. In fact, PM Hun Sen originally wanted to visit Wuhan, the now-quarantined epicenter of the novel strain. PM Hun Sen told Chinese President Xi Jinping that he had decided to make a special visit to China with an aim to showcase Cambodia's support to China in the fight against the outbreak of the epidemic. The report was released by some Western media and diplomats. US officials always express their concerns over foreign military presence in Cambodia, referring to it as China's. However, the Cambodian government has always denied the allegation and denounced it as fake news and baseless accusation.

The country has to follow a policy of peaceful co-existence with its neighbors and with all

other countries throughout the world. Cambodia has to make a maximum number of friends and Cambodia has to know how to deal with superpowers as a good friend because its prime objective is to maintain political stability, peace and social order to promote human dignity and economic prosperity and to alleviate poverty.

The low-hanging fruit has already been picked and China finds itself in the position of trying to avoid becoming caught in the middle-income trap. While Beijing has doubled down on the BRI initiative in order to expand its export markets in order to resolve issues of excess domestic capacity, and has implemented policy initiatives such as “Made in China 2025” that have certainly achieved some success, greater de-centralization and reform is still necessary. However, these reforms do not seem palatable to a regime that under President Xi Jinping has only tightened party control. China’s GDP growth estimates for this year continue to be revised downwards in light of the trade war, tightening of domestic credit supply, and the increasingly worrying impacts of the coronavirus outbreak on domestic economic activity. Whether China will achieve its much-coveted high-income status very much remains an open question.

On February 11 2020, the EU Commission announced the very first (partial) withdrawal of an Everything but Arms (EBA – Everything but Arms) status. It affects Cambodia, due to serious and systematic violations of the human rights principles enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

This gave room for further dialogue between Cambodia and the EU and to continue urgently needed talks.

The main factor is the commercial and strategic interest of the EU. The decision comes at a bad time, as China, another big economic partner for Cambodia, is in deep trouble, with the coronavirus, the trade war with the US and the democratic movement in Hong Kong.

Robert Hör, Diplomatic Briefing: New Decade, Old Challenges, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, <https://www.kas.de/de/einzeltitel/-/content/diplomatic-briefing-new-decade-old-challenges-3>.