**아주대 중국 정책 연구소 정세 분석 세미나 (벙커) 자료 (5. 6) – 김민경**

**주제 : 인도 태평양 정책**

**● 중국**

**- 기사(4.11) : The danger of china’s maritime aggression amid COVID-19**

 (<https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/the-danger-of-chinas-maritime-aggression-amid-covid-19/>)

For several weeks, **China has been hounding Indonesian fishing vessels in the Indonesian waters off**[**the Natuna Islands**](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/world/asia/Indonesia-south-china-sea-fishing.html)**.** Chinese fishing fleets with the support of armed Chinese Coast Guard ships have been encroaching into areas that Indonesia considers exclusive. Indonesian fishermen are perturbed that the government in Jakarta is not doing anything to protect them.

......

last week, **China rammed into and sank a Vietnamese shipping boat** with eight fishermen on board while they were out fishing in the Paracel Islands, which are controlled by China but also claimed by Vietnam. The spokesperson for Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs [stated](http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns200404161321/view) that the Chinese action “violates Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands . . . [and is] not conducive to the development of the bilateral relations between the two countries as well as the maintenance of peace, stability and cooperation in the East Sea (South China Sea).” Vietnam also lodged a formal protest against China at the local embassy in Hanoi.

**● 미국**

 **-** **기사 (4.14) : Advancing democracy in the US free-and-open Indo-Pacific-Strategy**

 (<https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/advancing-democracy-in-the-us-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy/>)

 But at this point, the governance pillar, which is short for **enhancing democracy, human rights, good governance, and civil society,** remains by far least developed of the three. Though some efforts have begun to be advanced thus far, making further inroads will require managing ongoing challenges as well as furthering opportunities in concert with allies, partners, and other interested actors for the rest of 2019 and beyond.

 But the challenge of advancing governance as a pillar in U.S. Asia strategy has also gotten more complex with **the advent of the Trump administration and FOIP. For one, a series of trends, including fears of a democratic retreat, rising populism, and the proliferation of technologies that enable authoritarianism, have only further muddied the context for the advancement of American ideals.** For another, the Trump administration’s own issues with democracy and human rights – including the president’s anti-democratic actions at home and praise of dictators abroad – has also admittedly widened the perceptions gap between what Washington does itself and what it tells others to do, even though U.S. policy continues to be advanced more quietly and selectively at the working level and through a range of established and important democratic assistance programs.

- **국제 전략 문제 연구소(CSIS) 자료** (<https://amti.csis.org/the-indo-pacific-enigma/>) **4.21**

A series of views published in the Australian National University’s East Asia Forum last month provides several perspectives in this continuing debate. The [first](https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/03/15/whither-the-united-states-in-the-indo-pacific/) questions U.S. strategy in extending the Asia-Pacific concept to India when its real focus is China, North Korea, and Taiwan. [Another](https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/03/15/why-india-isnt-going-to-save-australia-from-chinas-power/) suggests that, “rather than India leading a grand Indo-Pacific coalition against China, it is more likely to cut a deal with China to divide the wider Indo-Pacific region up between them.” A [third](https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/03/16/the-indo-pacific-linus-blanket/) posits that, “For now, the Indo-Pacific idea is based on implausible assumptions about India’s political posture, amateurish calculations of India’s projected economic power and unrealistic expectations of American commitment.”

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who had described the Indo-Pacific concept as a “[headline grabbing idea](https://jamestown.org/program/the-prcs-cautious-stance-on-the-u-s-indo-pacific-strategy/), like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean, which may get some attention but will soon dissipate,” would certainly be pleased.

The shape of the Indo-Pacific of the future will be determined by “[the ambitions of China, the interests of India, the re-emergence of Japan, the confidence of Australia and the awareness of ASEAN, among others](https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31915/Keynote_Speech_by_External_Affairs_Minister_at_Indian_Ocean_Conference_in_Maldives_September_03_2019).”  And as the minister went on to say, “Where India can really make a difference is in the Indian Ocean itself. That is not just a natural arena for its influence but of overriding security consequence.”

**- 기사 (4.27) : COVID-19 Offers a Golden Opportunity to Reengage with the Indo-Pacific (Defense one)**

(<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/covid-19-offers-golden-opportunity-reengage-indo-pacific/164944/>)

The Department of Defense [Indo-Pacific Strategy Report](https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF) describes the Indo-Pacific as “the single most consequential region for America’s future.” Yet for all the rhetoric—see also the administration’s [2017 National Security Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf) and the State Department’s [A Free and Open Indo-Pacific report](https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-o)—concrete action has failed to keep pace. State Department vacancies in South and Central Asia [remain high](https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697281.pdf). Ambassador positions in key countries such as Singapore [have gone vacant for years](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/trump-barbera-h). The administration [downgraded its participation](https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/us-to-downgrade-east-asia-summit-participation-in-2019/) in important regional forums even as it continues to spar with allies like South Korea over [basing costs](https://www.reuters/). Some fear the administration [may be destroying](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/a) the alliance system that served the U.S. so well for seven decades.  ...... Should U.S. leaders choose to act decisively with their regional partners and allies, they would not only help to combat the pandemic, they would also serve to reestablish the United States in its traditional leadership role.

...... To find the will to act on a sufficient scale in the Indo-Pacific, Washington will first need to see the crisis for what it is. The illness and death that follows in the wake of COVID-19 is not an isolated public health problem. The weakening of U.S. alliances and partnerships is not an isolated diplomatic problem, and the threat that China’s quest for regional influence poses to the rules-based regional order is not an unrelated national security issue.

● **유럽**

 - Observer Research Foundation 자료(4.18)

(<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-eu-summit-2020-defining-the-future-of-the-strategic-partnership-64817/>)

In India, **the abrogation of Article 370**[[1]](#footnote-1) and the subsequent imposition of a communications blackout in Jammu and Kashmir**, the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (2019)**[[2]](#footnote-2), and **the institution of the National Register for Citizens (NRC)**[[3]](#footnote-3) have garnered significant international attention. For the EU, the existing uncertainty in trade due to Brexit is now offset by a significant slowdown in manufacturing and a large health crisis due to the widespread cases of COVID-19 across Europe. Drawing on these developments, it is imperative that the next EU-India summit host discussions on the several issues that will define the future of the strategic partnership.

1. 인도 헌법 370조의 폐기

 : 파키스탄과의 분쟁지역인 카슈미르에 외교, 국방 정책을 제외하고 모든 자치를 허용하는 특별 자치 조항을 삭제한 것. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. 인도 시민권법 개정안(CAA): 방글라데시, 파키스탄, 아프가니스탄 등 3개 인접국 출신 ‘비무슬림 불법 이민자’에 인도 시민권 부여. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 국가 시민 명부(NRC) : 모든 인도 시민들의 이름이 등록부에 기재 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)