Article 1

Writer : Kevin Rudd - Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).

Address : <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/xi-jinping-political-report-19th-congress-by-stephen-s--roach-2017-10>

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**Deng Xiaoping’s maxim, “hide your strength, bide your time, and never take a lead” has already been dead for some years. The just-completed 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was its state funeral.** **Xi is now proclaiming explicitly to his own people and the world that it is time for China to take center stage within the global order, and to create a new type of international relations.**

So, beyond the pomp and ceremony of the 19th National Congress, it is crucial to understand what its outcomes will mean for China and the world.

Article 2

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Address : https://www.csis.org/analysis/xi-jinpings-19th-party-congress-speech-heralds-greater-assertiveness-chinese-foreign-policy

Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Speech Heralds Greater Assertiveness in Chinese Foreign Policy

October 26, 2017

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At the heart of Xi’s vision for China’s future is a two-stage plan he put forward to achieve China’s second centennial goal of becoming a “fully developed nation” by 2049—the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. The objectives laid out by Xi for the first stage from 2020 to 2035 are primarily domestic, with the end goal of “basically realizing” socialist modernization. **The only reference by Xi to China’s international role during this stage is that the country will become a “global leader in innovation.**” However, in the second stage from 2035 to 2045, Xi set forth a more outward looking agenda. By the middle of the 21st century, **Xi asserted, China will have become “a global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence.”**

Importantly, Xi explicitly maintained that his articulation of China’s future derives from an assessment of the international situation that is favorable to China. After noting that the world is “in the midst of profound and complex changes,**” Xi drew attention to what he described as “trends of global multipolarity” that are “surging forward” and “changes in…the international order” that are accelerating.** He furthermore noted that “**relative international forces are becoming more balanced.”** In another part of the speech, Xi declared that “the Chinese nation…now stands tall and firm in the East.” These statements collectively suggest that Beijing is optimistic that the global balance of power is trending in its direction. **China’s judgment that the United States is in decline,** which can be traced to the onset of the global financial crisis in 2009, is even more certain today, as it sees **American global leadership eroding under President Trump.**

China’s prediction of U.S. decline combined with Xi’s confidence in China’s future likely inspired Xi’s unprecedented espousal of China’s development path as a model for the world, especially developing countries. According to Xi, **socialism with Chinese characteristics has “blazed a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization” and** **provides “a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development.”** Moreover, it “offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” Such statements express an apparent belief that China presents a credible alternative to liberal democracy.

Xi’s message to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) regarding Chinese military priorities, although not tied to advancing concrete foreign policy objectives, suggests a perceived need to be prepared to employ military power and hints at a greater willingness to do so in the future. Underscoring that “**a military is built to fight,” Xi called on the PLA to “regard combat capability as the criterion to meet in all its work” and to focus on “winning wars” if called upon to fight.** By the end of the first stage in 2035, “modernization of our national defense and our forces” will be “basically completed,” Xi declared**. At the mid-century mark, Xi expects the PLA will be “fully transformed into a first-tier force.”** Such desires are not unusual; rising powers often seek to reinforce their expanding security needs with military might. However, the pairing of these objectives with Xi’s ambition to increase China’s international influence and serve as a development model reinforces the widely held assessment that China harbors a deep-seated desire to displace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.

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Article3

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point

**1. China will rely on markets more as a means of allocating resources than as a driver of growth.**

**2. Xi also made clear that the ongoing military modernization effort would not be slowing down.**

**3. The 19th Party Congress has provided little reason thus far to think that Beijing will soften its stance, either domestically or abroad.**

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Article 4

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The Four Traps China May Fall Into

What is not emphasized in the report is that China’s path toward becoming a world leader is not likely to be smooth sailing. In order to fulfill these ambitious targets, **China has to overcome four traps: the Middle-Income Trap, the Tacitus Trap, the Thucydides Trap, and the Kindleberger Trap.**

**The Middle-Income Trap occurs when a country attains a certain income and gets stuck at that level, which falls short of that of advanced economies.** SKIP… Beijing is taking a more proactive approach in promoting other developmental goals, including environmental protection and poverty alleviation. Sensing incoherence and contradiction in central policy, local officials may turn to strategic disobedience, timidity, or inaction in policy implementation, which can be exacerbated by the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. As a result, China may well find its economy end up like that of Mexico, Brazil, or Argentina, which show clear signs of the Middle-Income Trap.

**The Tacitus Trap** is a term coined by the Chinese, although it is likely derived from Tacitus, a historian of the Roman Empire. It describes a situation where no matter what the government says or does, people will consider it a lie or a bad deed. **President Xi himself used the term to highlight the need to maintain government credibility, without which “the Party’s legitimacy foundations and power status will be threatened.”** **In order to overcome the Tacitus Trap, the Chinese state is supposed to introduce more transparency, restructure state-society relations, and renew its legitimacy base**. Chinese-style democracy has never been healthier and China has absolutely no need to import the failing party political systems of other countries.”

**The Thucydides Trap is the theory that a rising power will inevitably challenge the dominance of an existing hegemon, and the latter’s fear of that prospect can trigger competitive dynamics that ultimately lead to confrontation, even war.**

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**The Kindleberger Trap** was coined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye but derived from the late economic historian Charles Kindleberger. **Both the Thucydides Trap and the Kindleberger Trap highlight the danger** **inherent in the shifting balance of power.** What makes them different is that rather than focus on the threats from a strong aspirant power (as implied by the Thucydides Trap), the Kindleberger Trap attributes the failure of the international system to the under-provision of global public goods

**The four traps are nevertheless not mutually exclusive.** For example, both the middle-income and Tacitus traps undermine China’s ability to project its international power and influence, while the Thucydides Trap and the Kindleberger Trap both shape the international security and governance landscape that provides incentives or disincentives for China to address its domestic political and economic challenges. President Trump and his China team may have to keep the four traps in mind in their dealings with an increasingly confident and assertive China.

Article 5

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Civil liberties, terrorism

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Address : https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2017/10/30/441797/its-about-the-wars-and-trump-not-the-aumf/

It’s About the Wars and Trump—Not the AUMF

The tragic loss of four U.S. Marines in an ambush in Niger has sparked renewed attention on the scope of the multiple ongoing wars against terrorist groups. Debate has centered on the source of legal authority for those wars, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). This Monday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold a hearing on this authorization. However, as strange as it is to say, Congressional focus on this 16-year-old law is premature at this stage in the Trump administration. Instead, what is urgently needed is a strategic assessment of the wars themselves and clear-eyed consideration of President Donald Trump’s recklessness and unsuitability to be entrusted with broad war powers.

**As Congress re-engages this debate, its focus must be on the actual wars—not just the legal authority.** For too long, any discussion about the fight against terrorist groups has been confined to a narrow discussion of the legal authorities that support those conflicts. Bizarrely, many have used skepticism about the AUMF as a substitute for a more politically risky path of questioning the actual wars, leaving any Congressional action to focus on obtaining a new vote on a new or renewed authorization for those wars. However well-intentioned, that dynamic only further entrenches the fight against terrorist groups a “forever war.”

**Before acting on any new war authority, Congress must examine the major strategic shifts occurring in the fight against terrorist groups in multiple theaters.** The Trump administration has announced that it is sending more troops to Afghanistan, returning to a war footing against the Taliban. Additionally, the administration is, reportedly, putting CIA paramilitary teams on the ground in kill-or-capture operations against Taliban militants. The fall of Raqqa marks a turning point in the fight against the Islamic State, as the group has lost most of its territory in Iraq and Syria. Big questions now must be answered about the direction of U.S. military operations against IS.

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**Congress must assess critical questions about the conflicts, including whether U.S. military engagement is still necessary, and, if so, at what level. Congress must also examine the Trump administration’s strategy for fighting and winning these conflicts.**

Layered onto any consideration of providing President Trump with renewed war powers is the growing bipartisan recognition that Trump is unfit to be commander in chief. The Republican chairman of the committee holding Monday’s hearing, Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN), said this week that **President Trump must be “contained” by his senior staff or else he could “move our country into a binary choice which could lead to a world war.”**

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Congress must tackle these challenges head on. **It must debate the actual wars, not just the legal authority that supports them.** And it must deal with the extremely dangerous elephant in the room; that Trump is reckless, incompetent, and so unfit to be commander in chief that he must be contained to limit the threat he poses to the security of the United States and the world. **That is the debate the American people deserve and need before any consideration by Congress of new or renewed authorization for the use of military force and what measures it can take to put meaningful limits on the war powers of this president.**

 Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010- 2012).